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Abstract
We simulate the performances of a standard derivatives portfo-
lio to evaluate the relevance of benchmarking in terms of downside
risk reduction. The simulation shows that benchmarking always leads
to significantly more severe losses in average than those generated
by letting the portfolio reach the end of a given horizon. Moreover,
switching from a 0-correlation across underlyings to a very mild form
of correlation significantly increases the probability of reaching the
downside benchmark before maturity, whereas adding more correla-
tion does not significantly increase this figure.
Keywords: Derivatives; Portfolio management; Benchmarking;
Downside risk; Monte-Carlo simulations.
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1 Introduction
Controlling the downside risk of derivative portfolios is a permanent concern
in financial practice. The first explanation to this phenomena is the long
series of financial disasters associated with derivatives, such as for instance
Barings Bank and Long Term Capital Management that resulted in losses
ranging in billions of US dollars. Lessons from those experiences led financial
regulators, through the Basel II Capital Agreement for instance, to severely
monitor the risk taken by financial institutions. The second explanation has
psychological roots, mainly associated with the largely-observed aversion to
losses as formalized by Kahneman and Tversky [10], and to a lesser extent
by the fear of mis-assessment of uncertainty as in Du and Budescu [3] (see
for instance Jarrow and Zhao [9] and Liu et al. [11] for a discussion).
Practical control of downside risk nearly always involves benchmarking ;
that is, liquidating or entirely reshuffling a position once a pre-determined
level of losses is reached. This issue is documented in Basak et al. [1] for
equities portfolios, and in Pedersen [12] for derivative portfolios. This prac-
tice is typically based on the belief that a trading strategy, leading to certain
level of losses once, is too risky and must be abandoned to a new one.
The objective of the paper is to evaluate the relevance of benchmarking
in terms of loss reduction, and to isolate some factors significantly affecting
the riskiness of derivative portfolios. We carry out a Monte-Carlo simula-
tion of the performance of a derivative portfolio consisting of four classes
of options (a European, Asian, lookback and cash-or-nothing option) with
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same maturity, each class consisting of one hundred derivatives written on
one hundred different underlyings. The prices of the underlyings all follow
a standard geometric Brownian motion, as in the Black-Scholes framework.
The initial wealth is equally allocated across all options, and once maturity
is reached the proceedings are reinvested in the same portfolio in the same
manner. Such reinvestments span roughly six years, and the return of the
portfolio after those six years is compared with the potential losses generated
by benchmarking at pre-determined levels. The scenario is simulated 2500
times to generate Monte-Carlo estimators on which we base our discussion
(see Glasserman [6] for an introduction).
The experiment shows that benchmarking leads to significantly more se-
vere losses in average than those generated by letting the portfolio reach
the end of the six years, for every level of benchmark and for every level of
correlation across underlyings. The recovery rate, as defined in Section 1.3,
is however decreasing with the benchmark level albeit always significantly
high. Moreover, switching from a 0-correlation across underlyings to a very
mild form of correlation enormously increases the probability of reaching the
downside benchmark before maturity, for every benchmark level, whereas
adding more correlation does not significantly increase this figure.
The intuition for those results can be derived from the well-known Gam-
bler’s Ruin problem, as described in Grimmett and Stirzaker [7] Chapter 3,
even if the random process characterizing our portfolio return is far more
complex and thus requires simulations. Consider a gambler tossing a fair
coin, and winning (resp. loosing) one monetary unit if head (resp. tail) oc-
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curs at each toss. The gambler tosses the coin until either her wealth reaches
a pre-determined upper-bound or ruin occurs. Standard results claim that
the game will end for sure, and the average number of tosses needed to reach
one of those two events decreases exponentially as the bound get closer to
the initial wealth. A ruin corresponds to reaching a downside benchmark in
our setting, and we observe similar results in the portfolio simulation. How-
ever, letting the gambler’s game continue even ruin occurs (through retaining
barriers for instance) leads to a wealth distribution at a given future horizon
whose mean is different from zero. In our experiment, letting the portfolio
reach the horizon of six years leads to an average return always greater than
the considered benchmark levels (up to 30% losses).
The basic insight is that benchmarking is a one-off decision, which rules
out any possibility of recovering current losses. The simulation shows that
our fairly standard portfolio displays a surprisingly high potential for future
recovery, which cannot be exploited when benchmarking is implemented.
The paper thus suggests that benchmarking does not control downside risk
but rather aggravates it. Moreover, we point out that derivative portfolios
are particularly sensitive to correlation across underlyings, and diversifying
the underlyings appears as a safer way of controlling downside risk.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe the experiment,
in Section 3 we study the case of 0-correlation across underlyings, in Section
4 we study the consequences of adding a mild form of correlation, in Section
5 we study the average time before reaching a benchmark, and Section 6
concludes. Tables and figures are given after the Bibliography.
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2 The experiment
In this section, we describe the assumptions used for the numerical simu-
lation. We start by describing the underlying assets on which the options
are written. The simulation involves a set of 400 different underlyings whose
price processes in a risk-neutral world are described by the equation
dSt = µStdt+ σStdWt, (1)
where St is the price of the underlying at time t, µ > 0 is the drift of process,
σ > 0 is the variance of the jumps assumed to be constant over time, and
Wt is a Brownian motion with law N(0, t) for every time t. Using standard
arguments in Stochastic Calculus, the solution to the stochastic differential
equation in (1) is given by
dln(St) = (µ− σ
2
2
)dt+ σdWt. (2)
We need a discretized version of the continuous-time process described in
Eq. (2) to carry out our numerical simulations. For every sequence of times
0 < t0 < ... < tn, the discretized price process above satisfies
Sti+∆ti = Sti exp
[
(µ− σ
2
2
)∆ti + σ²
√
∆ti
]
for every i = 0, ..., n− 1, (3)
where ² is a random variable generating the jumps with law N(0, 1). We will
fix the time horizon to be T = 3 months, and within this horizon we will
assume that there are 15 jumps occurring at the end of equal time intervals
(this would roughly correspond to weekly jumps) for every underlying. We
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assume that there exists a riskless asset whose return is r = 5% per annum.
By a standard no-arbitrage condition, it follows that µ = r. We assume that
the initial price of all the underlyings is St0 = 50, with volatility σ = 45% per
annum. The underlyings differ by the nature of the realized jumps ², and the
way those jumps are correlated is central to our analysis. We will describe
later our assumptions on those correlations, as we present our results.
2.1 The options
We now describe the classes of options constituting our portfolio. The port-
folio formation will be described next section, for now we just focus on the
assets that constitute it. Those assets are separated into four classes of op-
tions, described next.
The first class of options, denoted by the letter e, consists of 100 European
calls, each of them written on one of the 100 different underlyings whose
processes are described in Eq. (3). The maturity of the calls is 3 months,
with strike price K = 49. For any such calls, the payoff at the end of the 3
months is thus max{0, ST −K}.
The second class of options, denoted by the letter a, consists of 100 Asian
options, each of then written on one of the 100 different underlyings. For any
possible realization of the underlying S = (St)t=0,...,T , the payoff of the Asian
option is max{0, ST − S¯}, where S¯ is the mean of S.
The third class of options, denoted by the letter l, consists of 100 lookback
options, each of then written on one of the 100 available usual underlyings.
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For any possible realization of the underlying S = (St)t=0,...,T , the payoff of
the lookback option is ST−min(S), where min(S) is the minimum of S.
The fourth class of options, denoted by the letter c, consists of 100 cash-
or-nothing options with strike price K = 49 and end-payment Q = 10, each
of then written on one of the 100 available usual underlyings. For any possible
realization of the underlying S = (St)t=0,...,T , the payoff of the cash-or-nothing
option is Q if ST > K and 0 otherwise.
Table 1 gives the theoretical prices of those derivatives, obtained with
standard Monte-Carlo simulations independent of the other simulations used
for evaluating the portfolio performances (see Boyle et al. [2], Glasserman
[2] Chapters 4-5 or Hull [8] Chapter 22 for an introduction to the methods
used here, see Detemple et al. [4] for asymptotic properties of our estimators
and Joy et al. [5] for alternative methods).
Table 1
Monte-Carlo estimations of the individual risk-neutral valuations of the op-
tions. Codes are written in R (see R project [13]). Figures between brackets
are the variances of the estimators. Estimators are calculated with N=100,000
simulations.
European call Asian call lookback call cash-or-nothing
5.2745 3.1966 7.3431 5.0668
(0.02542) (0.01425) (0.02470) (0.01560)
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2.2 Portfolio formation
We now describe how our portfolio is formed. For a given initial wealth w0,
we allocate one-fourth of this wealth to every class of options. For a given
wealth allocated to one particular class, we purchase an equal number of
contracts written on the 100 possible options available for trade. That is,
we consider 400 different underlyings, the first hundred are used to write
European calls, the second hundred is used to write Asian calls and so on.
The wealth is equally distributed across all of those assets to purchase a
portfolio of options at the prices given in Table 1.
Once the first time horizon is reached and payoffs are realized, the pro-
ceeds are reinvested in a similar portfolio in the same manner as above. This
operation is repeated at most 24 times, which would roughly correspond to
6 years of trades. The timing and allocations among classes of assets are
described in Fig. 1.
We call a quarter any of such times where options expire and proceeds are
reinvested. The fact that options are kept until expiration instead of being
sold before is not restrictive. Indeed, since the current reselling price of the
option reflects any loss-gain incurred during the exercise, the reinvestment of
the realized gain-loss into similar assets would not affect the portfolio value
since the underlyings follow a Le´vy process.
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Figure 1: Portfolio formation in any given quarter.
2.3 Benchmarking policy
We now present how the performances of the above portfolio are measured,
and under which conditions the decision to cease further trades is made. The
initial wealth w0 is worth one million monetary unit, although this figure does
not affect the outcome of the simulation.
We first define benchmarking to be the decision to stop trades the first
quarter when the current wealth is below a pre-determined fraction of the
initial wealth. In contrast, we define no-benchmarking to be the decision
to carry on the trades until the last d = 24. We will consider N = 2500
simulations of the investment scenario above, and we define the failure rate
with benchmark to be the number of simulations where trades are stopped
because the benchmark is reached once, divided by N . Similarly, we define
the failure rate without benchmark to be the number of times during the
simulations where the final wealth is below a pre-determined benchmark at
quarter d = 24, divided by N . We abbreviate failure rate with FR forthwith.
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Those two notions allow us to define the recovery rate as
Recovery Rate =
FR with benchmark − FR without benchmark
FR with benchmark
,
so that it represents the percentage of simulations that have been wrongfully
stopped before the end of the planned exercise.
An interesting alternative to the above definition is first to assume that
the proceedings of a liquidation resulting from benchmarking is re-invested at
the risk-free rate until the end of the normal exercise, and then the recovery
rate can be defined by comparing the compounded proceedings with and the
final wealth without benchmarking. Similar qualitative results obtain in this
case, and this issue is thus omitted.
3 Benchmarking and recovery rate
We now present the results of our numerical simulations, allowing us to com-
pare the relative efficiency of policies with and without benchmark. In a
first step, we present the estimations of the various rates introduced in the
previous section, in the case where the underlyings are assumed to be all
uncorrelated pairwise. In a second step, we show how a mild pairwise cor-
relation among some underlyings can significantly affect the previous rates,
even if the main conclusions and policy recommendations remain the same.
The first set of results involves underlyings whose jumps have 0-pairwise
correlations. The experiment estimates the failure rates with and without
benchmarking of the portfolio scenario described in Section 1.2. The invest-
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ment scenario has been simulated N = 2500 times.
The experiment unambiguously shows that failure rates are significantly
higher when benchmarking is used, regardless of the benchmark level. More-
over, some figures in Table 2 are of practical relevance when evaluating the
riskiness of derivatives portfolio in general. A benchmark of .2 is quite
common in practice, and thus a well-diversified, fairly-priced portfolio has
a 13.08% chance of abruptly reaching this benchmark. That is; without mis-
management and with a good portfolio, there is roughly one chance in eight
for a business to go bankrupt when benchmarking. If instead managers show
more patience (or possibly stronger nerves), this same business has only a
very acceptable 4.44 % chances of reaching this level of losses if the portfolio
is run until the end of the scheduled exercise.
The benefits from avoiding benchmarking significantly depends on the
benchmark level. This aspect is illustrated in Fig. 6, where the failure rates
with benchmarking are contrasted with the corresponding recovery rates. Re-
covery rates are (approximately) decreasing with benchmark levels, although
they remain strikingly high with high benchmarks. For instance, for a bench-
mark of .2 roughly 65% of terminated trading exercises would have a yielded
a lower loss if benchmarking was avoided. That is; instead of stopping trades
and thus permanently accepting a 20% loss, in 65% of the cases carrying on
trades would have led to a loss (or possibly a profit) strictly less than 20%.
Our derivative portfolio thus have a strong recovery potential. This point
makes the case against benchmarking: once trades are stopped the loss is
permanent and strong recovery possibilities of such portfolios are foregone.
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4 Correlated underlyings
We now carry out the same analysis as before with the additional assumption
that the underlyings display some form of mild correlation described later.
This new assumption will strikingly change the quantitative features of the
previous section, in particular the riskiness of the simulated portfolio, whilst
not changing the optimality of no-benchmarking. The effect of correlation
on the recovery rate is also examined.
We now describe how assets are correlated. We refine the notation in Eq.
(3), for exactly the same underlyings and for every i = 0, ..., n− 1, as
Sκ,jti+∆ti = S
κ,j
ti exp
[
(µ− σ
2
2
)∆ti + σ²κ,j
√
∆ti
]
, (4)
where κ ∈ {e, a, l, c} is an index denoting the class of options the underlying
is assigned to as in Section 1.1, and j = 1, ..., 100 uniquely defines the option
within the class of options κ.
So far, we have assumed that the sequence of random variables (²κ,j)κ,j ex-
hibited 0-pairwise correlation. We now assume that the pairwise correlations
are described by variance-covariance matrices
cov(²e,j, ²a,j, ²l,j, ²c,j) =

1 ρ ρ ρ
ρ 1 0 0
ρ 0 1 0
ρ 0 0 1

for every j = 1, ..., 100 and for some ρ ∈ (0, 1); all the other underlyings
exhibiting 0-pairwise correlation. In words, for every j the underlying with
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index j has a pairwise correlation of ρ with the underlying of the same j where
the European call is written on, and is uncorrelated with all the other 397
underlyings. This corresponds to a very mild form of correlation, although
this assumption will significantly change the results from the previous section.
Table 3 gives the results for two levels of correlation. Such levels display
a clear trend and considering more correlation levels would not add to our
point. The failure rates with and without benchmarking display a peak for
ρ = .5, and figures slightly decrease for ρ = .7. The significant variations from
the no-correlation case of the previous section show the extreme sensitiveness
of option portfolios to even a slight change in correlation.
Figure 3 gives the recovery rates for ρ = .5 and ρ = .7, derived from Table
3. Such recovery rates are comparable for those correlations, although they
are significantly lower than those in the no-correlation case. The main point
to notice is that the addition of those mild correlations have reduced the
recovery rate to roughly slightly more than 50% (depending on the experi-
ment), which is an intuitive recovery rate as explained in the Introduction.
In other words, the addition of correlation across underlyings (even if mild)
leads to reduce the recovery rate by roughly 25 %, whereas it remains roughly
stationary after values greater than ρ = .5.
5 Quarters before failure with benchmarking
We now turn to describing how quickly the simulated portfolio reaches its
downside benchmark. In particular, we are interested in observing how sen-
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sitive the benchmark occurrence is to the correlation form described in the
previous section.
The first fact to notice is that the first quarter to reach benchmark in-
creases with the benchmark level, for every level of correlation. This is a
very intuitive aspect of the simulation, since it natural to expect that more
time is needed for a portfolio to reach to even lower benchmark.
An important result of the experiment is the significant decrease in first
quarters to benchmark between the 0-correlation case and the case with
correlation level ρ = .5. The point to notice is that the very mild correlation
level, as introduced in the previous section, triggers a much earlier cessation
of activities caused by benchmarking. Adding more correlation (ρ = .7)
does not significantly increase the first quarter of occurrence, showing that
switching from 0-correlation to some form of correlation is a threshold that
significantly affects this event.
In all cases, the average first quarter of occurrence is before the end of
our horizon. This reinforces our point that benchmarking is to be avoided
when evaluating derivative portfolio, since this practice tends to stop trading
activities too early with devastating effects as shown in the previous sections.
6 Conclusions
We have simulated the performance over time of a fictitious derivative port-
folio under standard assumptions. The experiment shows that stopping trad-
ing activities when reaching a pre-determined downside benchmark leads to
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severe losses, and those losses are always significantly reduced by allowing
trades to continue until a pre-determined horizon.
Moreover, the experiment shows the extreme sensitiveness of the portfolio
to the correlation across underlyings. Switching to a 0-correlation case to a
mild form of correlation significantly increases the riskiness of the portfolio
and the average first quarter of bankruptcy. However, adding more correla-
tion across underlyings does not significantly affect those figures. Regardless
of the correlation level, losses are significantly reduced by allowing trades to
continue instead of stopping when a downside benchmark is reached.
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Table 2
Monte-Carlo estimations of the failure rates with and without benchmarking
(see attached R code). Figures between brackets are the variances of the
estimators. Estimators are calculated with N=2500 simulations.
Benchmark level
.5 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3
Benchmarking 0.5556 0.346 0.2316 0.1308 0.0792 0.0472
(0.0099) (0.0095) (0.0084) (0.0067) (0.0054) (0.0042)
No benchmarking 0.1356 0.1076 0.0644 0.0444 0.0328 0.0216
(0.0068) (0.0061) (0.0049) (0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0029)
18
Table 3
Monte-Carlo estimations of the failure rates with and without benchmarking
for various levels of correlation between underlyings. Case I gives the failure
rates with benchmarking, Case II gives the failures rates without benchmark-
ing. Figures between brackets are the variances of the estimators. Estimators
are calculated with N=2500 simulations.
Benchmark level
.05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3
Case I ρ = .5 0.764 0.6872 0.6192 0.5136 0.4508 0.3632
(0.0084) (0.0092) (0.0097) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0096)
ρ = .7 0.7668 0.6472 0.5824 0.4816 0.3856 0.3448
(0.0084) (0.0095) (0.0098) (0.0099) (0.0097) (0.0095)
Case II ρ = .5 0.3484 0.328 0.296 0.2528 0.2344 0.1824
(0.0095) (0.0093) (0.0091) (0.0086) (0.0084) (0.0077)
ρ = .7 0.3364 0.2952 0.2772 0.2232 0.194 0.164
(0.0094) (0.00912) (0.0089) (0.0083) (0.0079) (0.0074)
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Table 4
Monte-Carlo estimations of the average number quarters before failure with
benchmarking, for various levels of correlation between underlyings. Figures
between brackets are the variances of the estimators. Estimators are calcu-
lated with N=2500 simulations.
Benchmark level
.05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3
ρ = 0 13.2548 18.2428 20.5252 22.3592 22.3592 23.5388
(0.2054) (0.1727) (0.1386) (0.0944) (0.0679) (0.0470)
ρ = .5 8.9084 11.2352 13.116 15.6196 17.4732 19.1684
(0.1879) (0.1950) (0.1926) (0.1836) (0.1662) ( 0.1493)
ρ = .7 8.7936 12.146 14.0112 16.4144 18.4368 19.504
(0.1863) (0.1967) (0.1906) (0.1777) (0.1590) (0.1434)
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Figure 2: Failure and recovery rates, uncorrelated underlyings.
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Figure 3: Failure with benchmarking and recovery rates, with correlation.
22
5 10 15 20 25 30
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
ρ=0
Benchmark in %
Av
er
ag
e 
qu
ar
te
r
5 10 15 20 25 30
10
12
14
16
18
ρ=.5
Benchmark in %
Av
er
ag
e 
qu
ar
te
r
5 10 15 20 25 30
10
12
14
16
18
ρ=.7
Benchmark in %
Av
er
ag
e 
qu
ar
te
r
Figure 4: Average quarter before failure for various levels of correlation.
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